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American  aims  can  be  grouped  under  three  headings.  The  first
is  security-the  preservation  of  our  own  safety.  The  second  is  the
creation  and  the  maintenance  of  a  tolerable  world  order.  The  third
is  the  pursuit  of  a better  life  for  all  men.  The  three  objectives  are
interdependent,  and  it  is  quite  clear  that  we  shall  never  get  very far
in  one of these areas  unless  at the  same time  we  are  making  progress
in the  other two.
What  prevents  us from  moving  more quickly  in  these  directions?
There  is  no simple  answer.  Some  would  say  that  the  difficulty  lies  in
the  frailties  of  man-in  his  aggressive  tendencies,  his  greed,  his
cruelty,  his  lust  for  power.  Others  would  point  out  flaws  in  human
societies-their  raw nationalism,  or  the  human exploitation  that  they
tolerate.
These  are  matters  for  the  social  and  political  philosopher.  Men
have  cooperative  as  well  as  competitive  instincts,  and  that  interde-
pendence may be as  powerful a factor in  the future of man  as divisive
group rivalry.  If this should not be the  case we are  inevitably  doomed
to a frightful Armageddon.
PRESERVATION  OF  SECURITY
I  would  suggest  that  free  governments  offer  far  more  hope  for
the ultimate  supremacy  of man's constructive  instincts  than the  totali-
tarian  regimes  existing  beside  them.  The free world  must  act  to pre-
serve  its  freedom  if  the  options  of  progress  are  to  continue  to  re-
main  available  to  us.  There  is  in  fact  a potential-perhaps  an  actual
-conflict  between  the  Communist  sector  and  the  non-Communist
areas  of the  world.  And  by virtue  of our  size,  strength,  and  fortune,
it  is  our  responsibility  to  exercise  leadership  in  the  free  world's  re-
sistance  to those who would  subvert  and  destroy  it.
We  do  not  seek  to  fulfill  our  responsibilities  by  dominating
others.  We  are  not  crusading  against  Communist  governments  where
they  exist.  But  neither  can  we  permit  Communist  states  to  press
their  own  campaigns  of  conquest  down  a  one-way  street  of  non-
resistance  to  an ultimate  triumph.  If  the  first purpose  of  our  foreign
policy is national security, surely here  is the ground on which  we must
preserve it.
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Communist  menace.  Some  of  our  foreign  friends  have  argued  with
us that communism,  at least  in Europe,  was  acquiring the  mellowness
of  maturity;  that  it  was  becoming  respectable  and  even  a  bit  bour-
geois;  that by building  up  contacts  between  East  and  West we  could
hasten  the  day  when  we  no  longer  need  to  fear  Communist  aggres-
sion.
But the  accent  must  be  on  prudence.  We  must not  forget  that  a
regime  which  calls  for  peaceful  coexistence  can  suddenly  precipitate
a  Cuban  missile  crisis.  Communist  states  differ  from  one  another,
it  is  true;  but  as  the  Secretary  of  State  has  remarked,  they  differ  in
the  method  of  carrying  out  their  goal  of  world  domination,  not  in
the  end  itself.
I  hope  you  will  read  the  revealing  statement  of  Chinese  Com-
munist  Defense  Minister  Lin  Piao,  issued  September  3  in  Peking.
It  is  an  astonishing  diatribe  which  starts  from  Mao  Tse  Tung's
brutal thesis  that  "political  power  grows  out  of the  barrel  of a  gun,"
and  notes  his  contention  that  "the  seizure  of power  by  armed  force,
the  settlement of the  issues by war,  is the  central  task and  the highest
form  of revolution."  The  statement  as  a  whole  is  a  summons  to the
so-called  peoples'  revolutionary  movement  in  the  rest of the world  to
reduce  North  America  and  Western  Europe  by  encirclement  and
conquest.  The  statement  attacks  what  it  calls  "Khrushchev  revision-
ists,"  too,  for  alleged  appeasement  of the  United  States,  but this  can
provide  only  limited comfort.
Hence,  the  first  aim  of  our policy-the  preservation  of  our  own
security-continues  to require an alert and resolute  response to Com-
munist  aggression wherever  and  however  it occurs.  We cannot accept
piecemeal  encirclement.  We  need  a  full  spectrum  of  the  instruments
of  power,  running  from  the  thermonuclear  deterrent  which  safe-
guards  us  from  massive  intercontinental  attack  to  the  counterinsur-
gency  weapons  which  must  be  used  against  so-called  "wars  of  na-
tional  liberation."  We  have  no  desire  to  be  the  gendarme  of  the
world,  but  we  have  a responsibility  to  ourselves  and  to others  which
we cannot  shirk.
As  the  record  shows,  we  have  used  our  power  with  restraint.
When  guerillas  moved  from  Bulgaria  and  Yugoslavia  into  Greece,
we  did not  attack  those countries.  We  mounted  a Berlin  airlift  rather
than  respond  to the  blockade  by  engaging  in  large-scale  fighting  on
the  ground.  We  did  not use  atomic  weapons  in  Korea,  though  at  the
time  our principal  adversaries  had  none.  We  did  not  make  it impos-
sible  for the Soviet Union  to retreat  peacefully  from  the  Cuba missile
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covert  attack  on  the  South  and  our  initiation  of  a  limited  attack  on
the North.  As President Johnson  has stated:  "We  seek no wider war."
It  follows,  then,  that  we  are  deeply  concerned  with  Communist
threats.  Such  a  threat  exists  in  Viet  Nam.  What  is  taking  place  in
Viet  Nam is  a massive  attempt  at  subversion,  supplied,  directed,  and
controlled  from  the  North.  We  are  committed  to  help  preserve  the
independence  of  South  Viet  Nam.  Our troops  are  fighting  alongside
those  of Viet Nam  to demonstrate  that  we  mean  to honor  that  com-
mitment.  Let  us make  no mistake-the  integrity  of the  commitments
of  the  United  States  is  a  foundation  stone  of  the  entire  free  world.
We  have  made  similar commitments  to  some  forty  allies. If  we flinch
here,  the  validity  of  all  those  commitments  is  necessarily  impaired.
The  effects  of a  defeat  might  be  felt  first in  Southeast  Asia,  but  the
shock waves  would  travel clear  around the  globe.
We make  no unreasonable  demands  for  a settlement  on  the  Viet
Nam  problem.  We  seek  no  bases  there;  we  want  no  permanent
armed occupation.  We have no territorial designs on North Viet Nam.
We  do ask  that,  as the  Secretary  of  State puts  it, Hanoi  and  its  allies
leave their  neighbors  alone.  We  believe  that the  people  of South Viet
Nam  should  be  permitted  to  select  their  own  government  through
free  elections,  and that  the  people  of all Viet Nam  should  be  able  to
participate  under  international  supervision  in  a  free  determination
of  their political  future,  in  accordance  with  the  Geneva  Agreements
of  1954.
Moreover,  we  are  ready  at  any  time-and  have  been  since
President  Johnson's  address  of  April  7  last  for unconditional  nego-
tiations  with  the  governments  concerned,  looking  toward  an  honor-
able  settlement.  Something  like  fifteen  attempts  have  been  made  to
initiate  discussions-directly,  through  allies,  through  uncommitted
nations,  and through  the United  Nations.  All  have  so  far  been  fruit-
less,  because  the other  side has had no interest  in  reaching a peaceful
settlement.  The United  States  will  persist  in  its efforts.
In  our  own  hemisphere,  we  have  applied  the  same  basic  doc-
trine in the Dominican Republic.  Again we have  used our power  with
restraint  to  preserve  a  free  nation's  independence  against  a  possible
Communist  take-over.
Thus,  on  both  sides  of  the  world,  we  have  moved  to  protect
our  security  by opposing  Communist  designs.  The  decision  to  do  so
has  not  been  easy,  nor  lightly  taken.  History  has  imposed  a  burden
of  responsibility  on  the  American  people,  and  they  have  accepted
it in  a spirit of calm  resolution.
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Our  security  must  be  relative  and  precarious,  however,  unless
it  is  established  in  a framework  of world  organization  which encour-
ages  international  cooperation,  not  only  for  peace-keeping  but  for
the  improvement  of  the  conditions  of  human  existence.  Since  the
end  of World  War  II,  we  have  worked  at  the  task  of  building  that
framework,  in  many  regions.  I  would  single  out  in  particular  our
efforts in Europe,  in the Americas,  and in the United Nations.
First,  a  word  about  our  policies  in  Western  Europe,  where
we  are  most  intimately  involved.  It  is  the  center  of  strength  of  the
free world,  the heartland  of the West.  And it is  the spawning  ground
of the great world  conflagrations  of this century.
We  sometimes  forget  the  dramatic  results  the  North  Atlantic
nations have  attained  through  international  cooperation  over  the  last
twenty  years.  It  was  clearly  about  to  lose-and has  indeed  lost-its
colonial  underpinning.  One  could  have  been  excused  for  saying,  as
many  did, that  "Europe  is  finished."
What  a  contrast  today!  Free  Europe  has  a  political  and  social
stability  and  a  dynamic  economy  which  far  surpasses  that  of  its
Eastern  European  neighbors.
The  United  States  played  an  important  part  in  the  striking  re-
covery  of  Western  Europe  after  World  War  II.  Through  Marshall
Plan  aid  and  the creation  of  the North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization
-two  great  acts  of  statesmanship-we  involved  ourselves  in  the
affairs  of Europe  in an unprecedented  way.  Our  economic  assistance
has long since ceased,  but the presence  of close  to 400,000 American
military  personnel  in  and  around  Europe  still  provides  one  of  our
firmest guarantees  of peace.
At  the  same  time  the  Western  European  states  have  made  ex-
citing progress  in  the  direction  of economic  integration  and  ultimate
political federation.  We  have watched  this development-centered  in
the institution-building  of the European Economic  Community-with
admiration  and  approval.  It  has seemed  to  us  to  offer  an  alternative
to the  divisive  internal  quarrels  of Europe.
Today  Europe  tends  to  look  critically  at  these  institutional  ar-
rangements.  On  the  political  and  military  side,  some  Europeans
question  the  Atlantic  relationship  as  it  now  exists.  They  are  inclined
to believe  that  by its very  success,  NATO  has worked  itself  out  of  a
job.
The thesis  is  enticing,  but we believe  it is  dangerous.  Europe  has
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East.  Berlin  remains  a  perennial  hostage  to  the  Communist  world,
and  a  potential  irritant  in  East-West  relationships.  The  growth  of
nationalism  in  Eastern  European  states  could  create  elements  of
instability  which  might  lead  to  presently  unforeseen  military  action
along  Iron  Curtain  frontiers-action  which  could  escalate  disas-
trously.  It seems  to us that the  integrated  military structure  of NATO,
and  the  political  structure  of the  Atlantic  partnership,  are  as  neces-
sary  today  as  ever.  We  see no other  means of coping  most  effectively
with the poised weight  of Soviet power; and we know from  the experi-
ence  of  two  wars  that  Western  European  security  is  in  essence  our
own.
In fact,  it  would  be  a  mistake  to  assume  that  the  most  adverse
views  on  NATO  within  the  Atlantic  Alliance-those  of  the  French
government-are  widely  shared  in  the  rest  of  NATO  Europe.  No
other  member  proposes  radical  changes  in  the  NATO  structure.  Far
from  being  restive  under  the  weight  of  American  influence  in  Eur-
ope,  the NATO nations  would view  with  alarm  any  move for Ameri-
can  retrenchment  there.  Even  the  French  government,  with  its  in-
sistence  on  the  independence  of  Europe  from  America,  has  not
denied  that  the  American  presence,  and  American  nuclear  power,
are  essential  to European  defense.  Even  if the French  should  exercise
their  option  of withdrawal  from  the  organization  in  1969,  as matters
now  stand  the  remaining  partners  would  continue  to  organize  their
defenses  within  it.
Yet  NATO  is  confronted  with  many  problems-problems  of
strategy,  problems  of  burden-sharing,  problems  of  collective  respon-
sibility  in  Alliance  matters.  I  should  like  to  dwell  briefly  on  two  in
particular.
The  first  is  the  problem  of  nuclear  responsibility.  Since  the  or-
ganization  of  NATO,  the  United  States  has  possessed  virtually  the
entire  nuclear  armament  of the  West.  And  it  has  retained  the  power
to  use  or  to  withhold  that  armament.  As  the  European  members  of
NATO  have  grown  in  strength,  they  have  naturally  come  to  desire
some  voice  in  the  nuclear  defense  of  their  territory.  They  are,  after
all,  the target  zone  for hundreds  of Soviet missiles.
To  meet  these  desires  by  giving  nuclear  weapons  and  delivery
systems  to  our  allies  would  be  starting  a  competitive  process  of  nu-
clear proliferation.  This  could  result in  making  the world  a  tinderbox
subject to incineration  as  a result  of some  accident  or  miscalculation
by one  of  the  many  possessors  of  nuclear  power.  For  the  danger  of
nuclear war  may  be  said  to increase  in  geometric  proportion  as  the
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stabilization  existing  between  the  two  major  powers-the  United
States  and  the  Soviet  Union-would  soon  lose  much  of  its  effective-
ness  if the  number  of national  nuclear  forces  grew  rapidly.
NATO  is  therefore  faced  with  the  task  of  sharing  nuclear  re-
sponsibility  without  stimulating  the  spread  of  nuclear  weaponry  to
country  after  country.  In  fact,  a  good  deal  has  been  done  to  cope
with the problem.  Under  the NATO stock-pile arrangements,  we have
made  available  to  a  number  of our  allies  important  nuclear  delivery
vehicles,  maintaining  the  nuclear  warheads  themselves  under  our
control  and  subject  to  our  release.  We  have  worked  out  with  our
NATO  allies  guidelines  for  the  use  of  nuclear  weapons  in  specific
contingencies,  methods  of involving  NATO  officers  of European  na-
tionality  in  the  day-to-day  work  of  targeting  and  planning  for  the
use of nuclear  forces,  and facilities  for exchanging  important  nuclear
information.
It  seems  clear,  nevertheless,  that  unless  ultimate  responsibility
for the  actual  control and  use  of  nuclear weapons  can  be  more  fully
shared,  this basic  problem  of the  Alliance  will  continue  to  exist.  For
this  reason we  have  joined with our  allies  in exploring  ways  to  create
some  new  form  of NATO  collective  nuclear  force  which  would  give
the Europeans  the  share to which  they are,  in fairness,  entitled  with-
out giving  them national  control  of nuclear  weaponry.  That  has  been
the  purpose  of  the  lengthy  studies  of  a  NATO  Multilateral  Force
or  an  Atlantic  Nuclear  Force  which  have  been  under  way  since
1960.  A  solution  has  thus  far  eluded  us,  and  the  growth  of  inde-
pendent  national  forces  in  France  and  in  Communist  China  is  an
inhibiting  factor.  But we remain willing  to  respond  to  allied demands
for  further  studies,  bearing  always  in  mind  the  connection  between
what we may do in this field and  what we  may want to do-when  we
can-in  working  toward  effective  disarmament  arrangements.
The  second  problem  of  NATO  relationships  to  which  I  shall
refer  today  is  political  rather  than  military.  It  is  a  problem  of  or-
ganization  and  purpose.  Though  the  military  aspect  of  NATO  has
bulked  largest  since  its  inception,  the  NATO  Treaty  makes  it  per-
fectly  clear  that  it  has  far-reaching  purposes  in  the  political  field
as  well.  Very  few  people  realize  the  extent  to  which  the  NATO
Council  in Paris is used from  day to day  as  a forum  for the  exchange
of views  on problems  of common  concern to  the  allies.
In  this  respect  NATO  is  unique.  But  much  more  can  be  done
and needs to be done. If we accept the view that the problem of main-
taining  free  world  security  against  Communist  threats  is  a  single
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partitioned  off  by  those  lines  on  the  map  which  the  NATO  Treaty
designates  as  the  NATO  defensive  area,  then  it  is  clearly  right  to
expect  that the  resurgent  European  members  of the  Atlantic  Alliance
should  play  their  proper  role  in  helping  to  carry  the  burden  of  free
world  defense.  What  we  need  to  do in NATO  is  to  work  out ways  in
which  we can harmonize  the  policies  of the members  of the  Alliance,
so that we have greater  mutual support  for those  enterprises,  military,
political,  and  economic,  which  need  to  be  undertaken  for  mutual
security  purposes.  The  process  of  developing  the  political  consulta-
tive  functions  of  the  NATO  Alliance  may  in  the  long  run  prove  to
be  the  most  difficult NATO  problem  of  them  all.
ORGANIZATION  OF  AMERICAN  STATES
In  our  search  for  a  better  world  order  we  have  also  worked
with  our  neighbors  to  the  South  to  improve  and  modernize  our
association  in  the  Organization  of  American  States.  It  is  a  historic
relationship.  It  has  grown  from  the  protective  shielding  of  new  and
weak  Latin  American  states  under  the  Monroe  Doctrine  into  a  true
cooperative  venture  for  collective  regional  defense.
In  recent  years  we  have  suggested  to  our  Latin  American  allies
that  the  main  danger  now  confronting  us  in  this  hemisphere  might
no  longer  be  outright  aggression  by  armed  forces  marching  across
frontiers.  What was  more  likely  was Communist  infiltration  and  sub-
version,  probably  from  bases  within the  hemisphere-guerrilla  action
supported  and  directed  from  abroad.  At  a  number  of  Inter-Ameri-
can  meetings  we  have  stressed  the  point  that  a  strategy  of  this  kind
could  destroy  the  independence  of one Latin  American  country  after
another  just  as  surely  as  military  conquest,  and  that  obligations  of
mutual  assistance  ought  consequently  to  apply.
This  is  not  an  easy  point  to  make  in  a  region  where  the  doc-
trine  of nonintervention  in  the  affairs  of other  countries  is  so  deeply
ingrained.  It  requires  a  psychological  readjustment,  and  some  pain-
ful rethinking.
The  Cuban  missile  crisis  certainly  demonstrated  the  threat  to the
free  world  which  a Communist  regime  could  pose  once  it was  estab-
lished  in  Latin  America.  The  discovery  of  Castro  arms  and  agents
in  Venezuela  and  other  countries-directed  against  the  free  govern-
ments  of  those  countries-was  a  further  object  lesson.  But  the  clear
and  present  danger  of  Communist  exploitation  of  political  revolt
in  the  Dominican  Republic  brought  the  lesson  home  to  us  and  to
the  Latin American  countries  in  still  more  striking  fashion.
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the  situation.  But  hard  choices  were  posed  to  the  Organization  of
American  States.  Most  OAS  members  believed  that  any  military
activity  in  the  Dominican  Republic  by  any  outside  power,  including
ourselves,  smacked  of intervention.  Yet  the  OAS  decided  that  it had
to  act.  A  number  of  the  Latin  American  states  joined  their  armed
forces  with  our  own  to  organize  an  Inter-American  Peace  Force,
which  maintained  a  balance  in  the  Dominican  Republic  until  the
three-man  OAS  negotiating  group  arranged  for  the  establishment  of
a  provisional  government  in  Santo  Domingo.
No  one  believes  that  a  crash  operation  of  this  kind,  however
successful,  can  in  the  long  run  prevent  Communist  incursions.  The
only sure response  to Communist infiltration  is  the creation  of healthy
and  progressive  political  and  economic  structures  in  the  countries
concerned.  Latin America  has  a  crying  need for economic-social  and
political  development.  In  large  areas  a  feudal  land  system,  a  one-
export-product  economy,  an  inequitable  tax  structure,  weaknesses
in  government,  an  uneducated  and  unhealthy  population-all  these
handicaps-present  a  massive  barrier  to  real  stability.  Our  friends
in  Latin  America  are  just  as  aware  of  their  need  in  this  respect
as  we  are.  That  is  the  genesis  of  the  Alliance  for  Progress,  the  great
cooperative  effort  through  which  we  in  the  American  Hemisphere
expect  to  raise  the  standard  and  the  quality  of  Latin  American  life.
After  some  initial  difficulties,  it  is  now  encouraging  to  note
that  the  prospects  for  the  Alliance  are  increasingly  bright.  Progres-
sive,  forward-looking  governments  are  appearing  on  the  scene  in  in-
creasing  numbers.  Despite  the  highest  population  increases  in  the
world,  the economic  indices  and  the  export  figures  are  up.  Tax  and
land reforms  and housing development  are  making  headway  in  many
countries;  self-help  rather  than  outside  aid  alone  is  increasingly
emphasized.  A  modern  private  sector  of  the  economy  is  taking  root.
There  will,  of  course,  be  very  difficult  periods  ahead.  The  entrench-
ed  forces  of  the  past  do  not  yield  easily,  even  to  this  concentrated
treatment.  We  may hope,  however,  that  the end  result  will be  a  free,
stable, and prosperous  Latin American society.
UNITED  NATIONS
Whatever  the  security  afforded  by  regional  alliances,  it  is  quite
clear that there is an overriding need for an organization  substantially
world-wide  in scope.
For  the  United  States,  the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations  and
the  United  Nations  organization  represented  the  best  arrangement
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to  prevent  another  world  war  catastrophe.  In retrospect  it  is  possible
that  the  hopes  of  at  least  some  Americans  were  raised  too  high.
Progress  toward  effective  international  organization  is  difficult  and
slow,  and  clearly  no  match  for  the  dizzying  pace  of man's  scientific
and  technical  progress  in the  art  of more  efficient  destruction.
Nonetheless,  as  we  see  it,  the  United  Nations  remains  the  best
instrument  we  have  to  diminish  conflicts,  persuade  nations  to  settle
them  peacefully,  and  get  at  the  root  causes  of  war.  UN  machinery
has  operated  to  keep  the  peace  in  a  dozen  cases,  some  of  them
involving  quite  sizable  military  forces  committed  on  behalf  of  the
organization.  The United  States  has  consistently  favored  the  strength-
ening  of  UN  peace-keeping  machinery,  in  every  practical  way.  We
shall continue to do so.
The  present  conflict  on  the  Indian  subcontinent  provides  a
useful  illustration  of  both  the  utility  and  the  limitations  of  United
Nations  action  in  the  peace-keeping  field.  The  controversy  between
India  and  Pakistan  over  the  status  of  Kashmir  was  brought  to  the
United Nations very  early in  its history. For  seventeen  years  a  United
Nations  observer  group  has  supervised  the  cease-fire  line  dividing
Indian and  Pakistan  forces  in Kashmir.
Now  that  we  face  the  misfortune  of  renewed  warfare  between
the  two  parties  to  the  Kashmir  dispute,  it  is  interesting  to note  that
the  United  Nations  is  the  primary  agency  of  the  international  com-
munity  in  the  search  for  restoration  of  peace  and  a  satisfactory
political  settlement.  We  fully  support  the  efforts  of  the  United  Na-
tions Secretary  General  to carry  out  the  Security  Council  resolutions
of  September  4  and  September  6  looking  toward  a  cease-fire  and  a
withdrawal  of  the  armed  personnel  who  have  advanced  in  both
directions.  With  all  its  weaknesses,  no  other  agency  could  perform
the same function as the  United Nations in  cases of this  kind.
The  peace-keeping  functions  of  the  United  Nations  have  been
impaired  by  the  unfortunate  controversy  over  the  application  of
Article  19  of  the  United  Nations  Charter.  The  issues  presented  in
this  celebrated  case  were complex,  but the main  problem  was  simple:
Should  the no-vote  sanction  imposed  in the  United  Nations  Charter
be  applied  to  members  who  by  choice  lag  more  than  two  years
behind in  payment  of their  share of legally  assessed  expenses,  includ-
ing peace-keeping  expenses  of the  organization?
We  feel  that  the  charter  is  clear  on  this  point.  The  Soviets,
the  French,  and  ten  other  states  took  a  contrary  view.  Contending
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for the UN to  keep  the peace,  they have  refused  to regard  as  obliga-
tory assessments  the  large  expenditures  made  for  UN military  opera-
tions in the Congo and in the  Gaza strip between Israel  and the  UAR.
The  controversy  over  this  matter  almost  paralyzed  the  United
Nations General  Assembly  for  a  year and  still  threatens  the  financial
solvency  of the  UN.  We have  been  forced  to recognize  that  the  bulk
of  the General  Assembly  would not  wish  to risk  the  break-up  of  the
United  Nations  by  imposing  the  no-vote  sanction  against  the  coun-
tries  in arrears.  In these  troubled  times  we  ourselves  would  not want
to  precipitate  the  collapse  of  the  UN.  Accordingly,  we  have  agreed
that,  without  prejudice  to our  legal position,  the normal  work  of  the
United  Nations  General  Assembly  should  be  resumed.  But  we  have
made  it  quite  clear  that  if  some  countries  insist  in  exercising  the
right to refuse  to pay their share  of legally  assessed  expenses  because
they object  to  the nature  of  the expenditures,  the  United  States  must
reserve  for  itself  a  similar  option.  In  short  there  can  be  no  double
standard.
The Article  19  dispute  is  thus  for  the  moment  settled.  Contrary
to  some  assertions,  the  outcome  does  not  signal  the  destruction  of
the UN's peace-keeping  capability. To be sure,  it will be  more difficult
to finance  such  operations  in  the  future,  and  the  role  of the  General
Assembly  as  opposed  to  the  Security  Council  in  peace-keeping  ac-
tivities  may be  somewhat  impaired.  But  where  a  sufficient  consensus
among  the  members  exists,  the UN  will  still  be  able  to find  ways  to
make  that  consensus  effective.  And  we  can  now  get  ahead  with  the
work  of  the  entire  United  Nations  system,  including  its  specialized
agencies  and its many  economic  and social  activities.
FUTURE  DIRECTIONS
Thus  far  we  have  been  looking  at  the  problems  of  survival  and
the  organization  of  peace.  To  complete  the picture,  we  need  to  note
that  there  are  other  ways,  in  the  long  run  more  effective,  for  eradi-
cating  the  causes  of  war  by  attacking  human  poverty,  misery,  and
ignorance.
Foreign  aid  is,  of  course,  a  case  in  point.  Though  its  future
has  sometimes  seemed  precarious,  it  has  remained  a  fixture  in  our
foreign  policy.  Our  programs  have  been  beset  with  obstacles  and
frustrations.  There  has been  disagreement  concerning  objectives  and
the means of attaining  those objectives.
Yet  great  progress  has  been  made.  Our  aid  program  has  been
sharpened  and  streamlined  to  serve  the  requirements  of  our  over-all
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and  Congress.  A  decade  ago,  two-thirds  of  our  aid  consisted  of
military  assistance,  and  much  of  the  remainder  was  defense  support
to help threatened countries  to  survive  in  the  short term.  Today,  two-
thirds of our aid  is economic,  and  long-term  development  rather than
emergency  aid  is increasingly  stressed.
Furthermore,  there  is  a  new  look  in  our  aid  policies.  First  of
all, we have increased  the concentration  and  selectivity  of our  foreign
assistance,  concentrating  the  bulk  of  it  on  a relatively  small  number
of  countries  in  Latin  America,  Asia,  and  Africa,  in  countries  of
priority  need  and  best  performance.  Second,  we  are  stressing  more
heavily  the  need  for  self-help  by  recipient  countries  as  a  condition
for  continued  assistance.  Third,  we  are  encouraging  both  foreign
and  domestic  private  investment  in  the  recipient  countries,  because
we  know  from  our  own  experience  that  this  will  facilitate  vigorous
growth  in  conditions  of  freedom.  Finally,  we  have  tightened  and
rationalized  the  management  of our  own programs  and reduced  their
operating  costs.  And  we  are,  of  course,  influenced  by  the  attitudes
of recipients  to  the  aid  program  itself.
An  additional  point  deserves  attention.  We  have  found  it  in-
creasingly  useful  in many  instances  to channel  our aid through  multi-
lateral  agencies.  In  this  way  we  minimize  the  sensitive  political  im-
plications  of  a  donor-recipient  relationship,  and  by  combining  our
contribution  with  the  contributions  of  others,  we  multiply  the  total
effect.  The  work of United  Nations programs  and  International  Bank
agencies  has  bulked  steadily  larger  in  the  foreign  aid  field.  We  wel-
come this  development  and will continue  to  encourage  it. In addition,
we  expect  to  continue  to  coordinate  our  foreign  aid  activities  with
those  of  the  other  major  free  world  donor  countries  through  the
Development  Assistance  Committee  of the OECD  in Paris.
We  recognize  that in  the  long  run  trade  may  be  just  as  impor-
tant  as  aid  for  the  developing  countries.  Through  the  Kennedy
Round  Program,  we  are  gradually  coming  to  grips  with  the  problem
of  the  massive  reduction  of  trade  barriers  in  the  interest  of  greater
world  prosperity.  The  task  is  most  complex  and  difficult;  entrenched
economic  privilege  nowhere  yields  easily.  Nevertheless,  we  mean  to
pursue  our  efforts  to  strike the  shackles  from  the world's  trade  in  the
interest of greater general  prosperity.
One  of  our  special  problems  in  this  field  is  the  need  for
arrangements  which  will  give  equitable  assistance  to  producers  of
primary  products.  There  are  sharply  differing  views  regarding  the
extent to  which  preferences  of one  kind or another ought  to be given
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should  have  of  reasonable  and  stable  prices  for  their  exports.  The
multiplex  controversies  here  defy  easy  solution.  We intend,  however,
to  persevere  in  the  search  for  agreements  which  will  balance  ad-
vantages  fairly  in the interests  of all parties.
Given  a  sounder  economic  base,  the  possibilities  would  increase
for  exporting  to  other  countries  some  of  the  ideas  we  are  putting
into  practice  here  in  the  Great  Society.  Let  me  merely  mention  a
few  fields  in which  we are  actively  exploring the possibility  of new or
improved  foreign policy  initiatives.
There  is  the  area  of  outer  space-not  merely  the  possibility
of  joint  new  ventures  to  celestial  bodies,  and  joint  experimentation,
but  also of  great practical  advances  in the  fields  of  meteorology  and
communications  through  the  use  of  satellites.
There  is  the  area  of  the  peaceful  uses  of  atomic  energy-the
advent  of  an  era  of  practical  nuclear  power  and  of  other  potential
uses  of  atomic  fission  and  fusion.
There  is  the  area  of  food  production  and  distribution-not
merely  the  massive  contributions  of  foodstuffs  under  our  Food  for
Peace Program  and  the  expanding  World  Food  Program  of  the UN
Food  and  Agriculture  Organization,  but  also  the  improvement  of
agricultural  techniques  in  underdeveloped  areas,  and  the  processing
and preservation  of foodstuffs.
There  is  the  area  of  water  resources  development-the  possi-
bility  of  finding  and  using  more  water,  of  desalting  water  economi-
cally  to open  new  lands  to  new populations,  and  of  fuller utilization
of the sea  and the sea  bed.
There  is  the  field of  health,  where  the  remarkable  progress  now
being  made  in  combating  so  many  diseases  can  be  carried  much
further with  additional  resources  and  knowledge.
There  is  the  field  of  education:  Illiteracy  remains  one  of  the
great  handicaps  of humanity;  it  can  yield  to  treatment.
There  is  the  field of  urban planning  and  housing,  where  we  can
move  toward  the  elimination  of  slums  and  squalor  and  all  the  at-
tendant social ills.
There  is  the  population  problem,  now  increasingly  recognized
as one of man's principal preoccupations  for the future.
There  is  the  field  of  human  rights-the  long  struggle  to  do
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man everywhere.
And  last  but  not  least,  there  is  the  need  for  disarmament  with
suitable  controls-a  problem  which  is  so  far  almost  intractable.
In  every  one  of  these  fields,  the  United  States  will  be  making
a  principal  contribution  to  progress.  That  is  why,  in  his  speech  at
San Francisco  last June,  President  Johnson  called  upon  all  UN  mem-
bers  "to rededicate  themselves  to  wage  together  an  international  war
on  poverty  . . . to  raise  the  goal  for  technical  aid  and  investment
through  the United Nations; increase  our food  and health,  and educa-
tion  programs,  . . and  face  forthrightly  the  multiplying  problems
of our multiplying  populations."
These  are  the  directions  in  which  we  must  look  for  the  achieve-
ments  of  the  future.  We  have  an  enormous  contribution  to  make.
I  am  not  referring  just  to  our wealth  or  our  techniques  or  our  size.
What  is  really  significant  is  what  we  have  to  offer  in  terms  of  ideas.
The  world  is  not  sufficiently  aware  of what,  for  lack  of  a  better
word,  I  shall  call  the  revolutionary  character  of  our  approach.  We
are-or  we  should  be  a  nation  which  is  known  to  stand  for  self-
determination,  for government  by consent  of the  governed,  for equal-
ity  of rights  for all  human  beings,  for the  possibility  of free  spiritual
and  creative  development  for  all,  for  flexibility  and  diversity,  and
for the  endless  pursuit  of  novel concepts  and  institutions.  We  do not
need  to  apologize  to  anyone  in  this  realm-certainly  not  to  Com-
munist  countries  which  are  trying  to  retain  nineteenth  century  doc-
trines  of politics,  ethics,  and  economics  in  a twentieth  century  world
and  which  rely  on  totalitarian  tactics  for  their  success.  Our  task  in
this  country  is  to  make  the  true  picture  come  clear  to all  men,  here
and  abroad,  and  to  foster  a  proper  appreciation  of  our  long-range
objectives.
There  is  a  very  wide  realization  of  this  need  in  Washington.
And  there  is  a united determination  to get  on with  the job.
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